First the “good news.” In its escalating war with Iran, Israel still faces “only” a non-nuclear adversary. This means that during episodes of competitive risk-taking, only Israel could reasonably expect to achieve “escalation dominance.”
Now the bad news. If Israel allows the present conflict to continue within its exclusively tit-for-tat dynamic, the nation could face seemingly interminable conventional war. During such a struggle, one in which the Jewish State might have no overwhelming tactical advantage, (1) Israel could suffer the tangible consequences of an Iran-defined war of attrition; and (2) Iran could plausibly proceed with its previously determined nuclearization.
How should Jerusalem proceed?
At some not-to-distant point, Israel’s only rational alternative to suffering continuous conventional weapons exchanges (prospectively, a modern aerial version of World War I trench-warfare) would be initiating significant change to national strategic doctrine. More precisely, this suggests a credible shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Though there could be no guaranteed outcomes in such historically-unique circumstances, this doctrinal shift would represent Israel’s best plan to avoid endless and eventually catastrophic war with Iran.
There is more. Harboring alternative hopes for regime change in Tehran would be futile and self-deceiving. Among other evident shortcomings, regime transformations are inevitably subject to prompt or incremental reversal.
Hope is never a strategy. Israel cannot rely forever on an implicit nuclear deterrence posture. Regarding its current war with Iran, it is now necessary for Israel to seriously consider once speculative but no longer inconceivable scenarios. Among other prospects, North Korea and/or Pakistan could sometime become nuclear proxies for a still non-nuclear Iran.
There are additional observations. Until now, Iran’s threats against Israel have been contrived (pretended irrationality). How else could we explain a non-nuclear state’s threats against a nuclear adversary? In principle, Israel could always call Iran’s “bluff,” but only if (1) its own non-nuclear forces were recognizably superior to those of its adversary; and/or (2) Jerusalem had made more explicit the country’s plausible nuclear options.
The only way for Israel to ensure “escalation dominance” in all realistic conflict scenarios would be to keep Iran non-nuclear. This is certainly Israel’s overriding current war objective, but it is not likely to meet this objective without a prompt shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” To be sure, there will be many technical questions concerning optimal levels and times of disclosure, but this is not yet the moment for publicly engaging such details.
.Even a pre-nuclear Iran could make combat use of radiation dispersal weapons and/or launch conventional missiles/drones against Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. In a potentially worst case scenario, Iranian ally North Korea would place certain of its own nuclear assets at Tehran’s disposal. North Korea has a history of involvement in Middle Eastern military matters (e.g., North Korea built a nuclear reactor for Syria at Al Kibar that was destroyed by Israel’s Operation Orchard on September 6, 2007).
For Israel, the time for “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” has come to an end. Failure to recognize this unprecedented inflection point could ensure perpetual war with Iran, a no-advantage belligerency within which Israel could suffer “death by a thousand cuts” and not prevent Iranian nuclear weapons. Though it is uncertain that “selective nuclear disclosure” would bring a conclusive end to Iran’s exterminatory designs against Israel, a more explicit nuclear deterrence posture now offers the best possible outcomes for both Jerusalem and the wider world.