![Israel must continue to be able to deter Hezbollah, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar stressed on Wednesday, speaking amid efforts to reach a ceasefire with Iran's Lebanese terrorist proxy. "We need to keep the freedom to act if there will be violations. And we will have to act in time, before the problem will grow," the minister told a gathering of nearly 100 foreign ambassadors in Jerusalem, the Times of Israel reported. A deal to end more than a year of fighting on the northern border must be durable, Sa'ar said, saying Jerusalem “would like to reach an agreement that will stand the test of time." He added that a ceasefire would be an "opportunity" for Lebanon to regain its sovereignty after the Israeli military severely degraded the Iranian-backed group in recent months. He called for the Lebanese Armed Forces to be strengthened and urged the international community to invest more in the economically devastated country, which is drowning in debt following years of mismanagement and corruption. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz also emphasized on Wednesday the necessity for Jerusalem to be able to act against any Hezbollah threats that may arise after a ceasefire deal is implemented. “The condition for any political settlement in Lebanon is the preservation of the intelligence capability and the preservation of the [IDF’s] right to act and protect the citizens of Israel from Hezbollah,” Katz said. Meanwhile, U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein remained in Beirut for a second day on Wednesday to discuss "technical details" of an American ceasefire proposal with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who heads the Hezbollah-allied Amal movement. President Joe Biden's point man in the Land of the Cedars announced he would travel to Israel on Wednesday night, speaking after he made "additional progress" in a second meeting with Berri. Hochstein was scheduled to meet with Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer shortly after his arrival, followed by a tête-à-tête with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the following day. “The meeting today built on the meeting yesterday, and made additional progress,” Hochstein said. “So I will travel from here in a couple hours to Israel to try to bring this to a close if we can.” The Biden envoy added that he will work with the incoming Trump administration on ceasefire efforts, saying that he has kept the president-elect's transition team informed of progress. Hochstein described as "very productive" his meetings with Lebanese officials on Tuesday. “We have a real opportunity to end the conflict, and now is the moment to decide. We are committed to doing everything we can to work with Lebanon and Israel to end this conflict,” Hochstein said at a press conference on Tuesday. Hochstein also met on Tuesday with Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, and he was scheduled to meet with Lebanese Armed Forces commander Gen. Joseph Aoun. Mikati emphasized that Lebanon’s primary objectives are achieving a ceasefire and safeguarding its sovereignty. He highlighted the need to implement international resolutions and bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces in the southern part of the country. Lebanon delivered its written response to the latest U.S. proposal on Monday. According to Ali Hassan Khalil, an aide to Berri, the response included “comments” that were “presented in a positive atmosphere.” He did not provide details on the nature of the comments, saying only that they “affirm the precise adherence to [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 1701 with all its provisions,” according to Reuters. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem said in a speech on Wednesday that the terrorist group had "read the ceasefire proposal. "We have our comments, and Nabih Berri has comments, and ours and the Lebanese government's comments are, Inshallah ['God willing'], identical," Qassem said. "We have decided not to discuss these ceasefire proposals or our comments in the media. All I will say is that Israeli is trying to obtain through negotiations what it couldn't through war." The terrorist leader vowed to “continue our efforts on the ground, whether the negotiations succeed or not. “We are confronting a savage enemy, and we will remain on the ground, no matter the cost, as we will also increase the cost for the enemy. We are facing Israeli human monsters supported by American human monsters,” threatened Qassem. Disarm and retreat Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War, stipulated that Hezbollah must disarm and retreat north of the Litani River, but was never enforced. The Litani lies some 20 miles from the Israel-Lebanon border. Its enforcement, along with Israeli freedom of operation in Lebanon should Hezbollah violate the terms of a ceasefire agreement, are the key sticking points in the current negotiations. Netanyahu emphasized during a speech in the Knesset plenum on Monday that Israel will not allow Hezbollah to “return to the state it was in on Oct. 6, 2023. “We will be required, in order to ensure our security in the north, to systematically carry out operations—not only against Hezbollah’s attacks, which could come. Even if there is a ceasefire, nobody can guarantee it will hold. So it’s not only our reaction, a preventive reaction, a reaction in the wake of attack but also the capacity to prevent Hezbollah from strengthening,” he said. Hezbollah has launched some 16,000 rockets, missiles and drones from Lebanon at Israel since joining the war in support of Hamas on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after the Gaza-based terrorist group’s massacre in southern Israel. More than 60,000 residents of northern Israel remain internally displaced due to the ongoing rocket and drone attacks from Lebanon. Seventy-six people in northern Israel have been killed by Hezbollah cross-border rocket, missile and drone attacks since the start of the war, including 31 soldiers and six foreign citizens, according to the latest data provided by the Prime Minister’s Office, updated on Sunday. In addition, 729 people have been wounded, including 497 civilians and 232 soldiers. Of these, 29 civilians and 37 soldiers were severely injured; 63 civilians and 38 soldiers were moderately injured and 405 civilians and 157 soldiers were lightly injured. Hezbollah’s leadership has been left in tatters following a series of targeted killings by Israel, including that of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on Sept. 27. This was preceded by Israeli sabotage of Hezbollah communication devices that killed 39 people and wounded more than 3,400 members of the terrorist group. Israel has been waging a devastating aerial campaign against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, including its stronghold of Dahieh south of Beirut. According to Israeli estimates, the terrorist group has lost most of its arsenal to the ongoing strikes. Then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said in late October that Hezbollah had lost an estimated 80%-plus of its long-range rockets since the start of the war. Israel also continues to battle Hamas terrorists in Gaza. The terrorist group still holds 101 hostages in the Strip, 97 of whom were kidnapped on Oct. 7. Many of the captives are believed to be dead. Brazil summit Meanwhile, G20 leaders gathered in Rio de Janeiro for a summit put out a joint statement on Monday calling for “comprehensive” ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. The leaders of the world’s biggest economies called for U.S. proposals to end fighting in Gaza and free the hostages, and one for Lebanon “that enables citizens to return safely to their homes on both sides of the Blue Line.” The 13-point U.S. proposal presented to Lebanese officials on Nov. 14 includes a 60-day truce, during which Lebanon would redeploy its troops along the border. The proposal also calls for Moscow to prevent Hezbollah from resupplying itself via Syrian land routes. Hezbollah would retreat north of the Litani River, with the border area then being under control of the Lebanese Armed Forces, overseen by the United States and Britain. Israeli officials are emphasizing, however, that the Israel Defense Forces must retain freedom of operation in Lebanon to thwart attempts by Hezbollah to violate the agreement and rearm and reestablish itself. A senior Israeli diplomatic official told Israel Hayom on Saturday that the IDF will retain operational freedom to respond to any security threats from across the northern border, regardless of any diplomatic arrangements. However, a source close to Hezbollah told The Washington Post that the group’s “condition for progress remains clear: Israel must be prohibited from conducting operations within Lebanese territory.” Berri emphasized at the time that any ceasefire agreement must not include the ability for Israel to attack by land, sea or air, Channel 12 reported. “Otherwise, what’s the purpose of an agreement?” he remarked. Another sticking point is Lebanon’s objection to the United Kingdom and Germany monitoring the implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701. Beirut reportedly favors the United States and France. If the ceasefire efforts fail, there are plans in the works to expand ground operations in Lebanon, an Israeli military official told the Post. Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer discussed the proposal with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump during a visit to his Florida estate earlier this month, as well as with senior Biden administration officials in Washington. Dermer also traveled to Russia to discuss the ceasefire proposal. Tehran is telling its Lebanese terrorist proxy Hezbollah that it supports ending the war against Israel, The New York Times reported over the weekend. Ali Larijani, senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on Nov. 15 to discuss the matter. Two Iranians affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps told the Times that Larijani conveyed messages to Hezbollah from Khamenei that he supported the end of the war and that the regime would assist with rebuilding the terrorist group’s forces and recovering from the war.](https://jewishwebsite.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Gideon-Saar-1320x880-2-218x150.jpg "Sa’ar: Israel must be free to act against Hezbollah truce violations")
Two presidential decrees recently issued by Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas aroused intense criticism in the P.A. The first, issued on March 2, imposes severe restrictions on the activity and finances of Palestinian civil society organizations.[1] The second, issued three days later, on March 5, suspends internal elections in all Palestinian professional unions for six months.[2]
The civil-society organizations fumed over the decrees, which they said were aimed at restricting their independence and preventing them from performing their duty of overseeing the government’s performance. They called them anti-democratic decisions that contravene the Palestinian Basic Law, as well as international conventions, and demanded that they be revoked.
These decrees are part of a series of anti-democratic measures recently taken by Abbas in order to tighten his grip on all the Palestinian oversight institutions and consolidate his autocracy. They come in the wake of several decrees issued in January that increased his control over the judiciary by replacing several judges with associates of his.
Those decrees, too, evoked outrage, both from Palestinian jurists and attorneys who fear the undermining of the P.A. judiciary, and from Abbas opponents, who warn that control over the judiciary could allow him to influence the planned upcoming elections, or even to cancel their results.
Abbas is apparently promoting the elections in order to burnish the P.A.’s democratic image and gain the approval of the Biden administration, while at the same time using the decrees to cement his one-man rule, and perhaps even predetermine the election results, or prepare the ground for canceling them or their results, if necessary. The contrast between these two tactics—of promising democratization on the one hand and restricting democracy on the other—is casting a pall over the preparations for the elections and putting their feasibility in doubt.
This report reviews the recent decrees, the criticism they sparked in the Palestinian civil-society sector and the attempts of Abbas to take control of the various Palestinian institutions and suppress criticism against him.
Decrees restrict civil society, suspend union elections for six months
Abbas’s March 2 decree(Decree No. 7 of 2021)—signed on Feb. 28 and published in the P.A.’s official gazette on March 3—essentially subordinates Palestinian NGOs to the P.A. government, granting it the authority to intervene in their activity and budgets. For example, Article 2.1 states that every organization “must submit to the relevant [government] ministry its yearly plan of action and estimated budget for the new fiscal year, which must conform to the work plan of the relevant ministry.”
Article 2.2 states that each organization must submit to the ministry two reports before the end of the fiscal year: “an annual report containing a full description of the association’s or institution’s activity over the year,” and “a financial report signed by a qualified accountant or auditing body, detailing in full the association’s or institution’s income and expenses …”
Article 3.3.states that “the association’s administrators’ wages and operating budget must not exceed 25 percent of its annual budget,” and Article 4 states that the organizations’ fundraising activities must conform to “a mechanism to be published by the government.”
The requirement to limit wages to 25 percent of the budget is one that many organizations will be unable to meet, and the decree implies that organizations that fail to meet this criterion will be dissolved. Moreover, the decree authorizes the government to seize the assets of dissolved organizations and incorporate them directly into the P.A. budget.
Article 5.2 states that the assets of a dissolved organization will be transferred either to the P.A. treasury or “to a similar Palestinian association or institution.” According to Article 6.2, the P.A. government will determine the fees to be collected from the organizations “for appeals submitted to the [relevant government] ministries.”[4]
It should be mentioned that the decree does not explain the urgency of the measures; nor does it set out clear criteria for implementing them.
On March 6, it was leaked that, one day earlier, Abbas had issued another presidential decree, on “suspending elections in the [professional] unions and popular associations and organizations.” This decree not yet been published in the P.A.’s official gazette.
According to the content reported in the media, it, too, contains no explanation regarding its aims and timing, and its purpose therefore remains unclear. The London-based daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid assessed that it is meant to suppress internal conflicts within Fatah, headed by Abbas, so as to preserve its unity ahead of the elections, and also to curb potential conflicts between Fatah members and members of the professional unions.[5]
Civil society organizations: Decrees violate international conventions
As stated, the recent decrees were met with fierce criticism, especially from civil-society organizations, which demanded to revoke them immediately, claiming that they transcend the authority of the president and are a flagrant violation of the Palestinian Basic Law and of international conventions to which the P.A. is signatory. They described the decrees as an attempt to dismantle the entire Palestinian civil-society sector or turn it into an arm of the P.A. government under Abbas, adding that, if implemented, they will prevent the organizations from fulfilling their duties, which include oversight of the government’s performance. Many asked why these decrees were issued now, ahead of the planned elections.
The International Commission to Support Palestinians’ Rights (ISCPR), for example, stated that the March 2 decree “widens the [already] extensive oversight powers of the executive branch … and severely restricts the freedom of action of non-profits and non-governmental organizations,” when the government should actually be protecting this freedom “in accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law and international human rights [conventions] to which the State of Palestine is signatory.”
It also questioned “the timing of the decree … [which came] concurrently with the initial preparations for the elections, in which [non-governmental] organizations play a major role, whether by raising awareness [of the elections] or by overseeing them …”[6]
Regarding the decree postponing elections in the professional unions, the ISCPR stated that it “contravenes the spirit [of democracy] and of the presidential decree that announced the holding of elections to the PLC, the presidency and the PNC.” It exhorted the professional unions to oppose this decree, which, “like previous ones, was issued without consulting anyone,” and called on Abbas to stop issuing “unnecessary” decrees and revoke the recent ones.[7]
A statement issued by the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) said that the March 2 decree “imposes unfair and unnecessary new restrictions” on civil-society organizations, turning them into “nothing more than departments of the relevant [government] ministries—[a move that] blatantly contravenes the character of their activity and the rationale for their public action as organizations that oversee the performance of the official [state] institutions.”
It added that curbing the freedom of these organizations and interfering, without justification, in their budgets could cause many of them to close down, thereby depriving their members of their livelihood. The ICHR expressed its support for the civil-society sector and for “the legal and legitimate struggle [of this sector] to have this decree revoked,” and demanded that Abbas stop issuing such decrees until after the establishment of the next PLC.”[8]
Another Palestinian human rights organization, Al-Haqq, circulated a legal analysis of the March 2 decree on the civil-society organizations, and stated that issuing it without any explanation or announcement by the government indicates “a clear intention to eliminate what still remains of the [P.A.’s democratic] political regime while the public is preoccupied with the election process.”[9]
Similar statements were made in a position paper by a group of Palestinian NGOs, which also launched a protest campaign against the decree.[10] Representatives of the professional unions announced a parallel campaign against the decree suspending internal elections, which they described as unconstitutional and unjustified.”[11]
Palestinian opposition movements, including Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), condemned the decrees as well. The PFLP stated that they contravene the understandings between the Palestinian factions regarding the election procedures, and that “there is concern they could be used to intervene in the results of any future democratic [election] process.”[12]
Hamas activist Marwan Abu Ras said that Abbas, whose term in office has actually ended according to the Palestinian constitution, is forcefully usurping the authorities of the legislative branch, and has thus become an absolute ruler, like a Pharoah.[13]
Decrees part of efforts to bolster status as president
As stated, Abbas’s latest decrees restricting the freedom of civil-society organizations are part of his recent policy aimed at bolstering his status as president, and especially at neutralizing any independent element that can oversee and criticize his performance.
Since Hamas’s 2007 Gaza coup, the P.A. has had no functioning parliament. The PLC elected in 2006 is not recognized by the P.A., and was, in fact, officially dissolved in 2018 by the Constitutional Court, which was itself established by Abbas in a presidential decree two years earlier.[14]
In the absence of a functioning parliament, Abbas governs by issuing presidential decrees that serve as a substitute for legislation. That is, Abbas, the head of the P.A. executive branch, has essentially usurped the authority of the legislature.
Moreover, Abbas has recently been using these decrees to take over the judiciary branch, as well. As part of this, on Jan. 11 and 12, 2021, he issued decrees that changed the structure of the Palestinian court system, and also appointed his associate, 84-year-old Judge ‘Issa Abu Sharar, as the permanent head of the High Judicial Council (the P.A.’s highest court). Al-Sharar had been appointed as the interim head of this council, meant to serve for only six months. The decrees also ordered several judges into “early retirement.”[15]
Many Palestinian jurists protested that the decrees contravened the Palestinian Basic Law, as well as the democratic principles of the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, and the Palestinian Bar Association has been campaigning for their cancellation for several weeks now.[16]
The decrees were also condemned by Palestinian journalists, who expressed concern that P.A. judges will from now on be appointed based on their loyalty to Abbas, and that the president will use the court system to disqualify candidates and lists, thus interfering in election results and crippling his rivals.[17] But the graver concern among Palestinian jurists and Abbas rivals is that the president will take advantage of his control of the High Judicial Council and Constitutional Court to cancel the elections or postpone them indefinitely if this serves his interests or to cancel their results if he loses.[18]
The P.A. has so far avoided giving clear answers to the concerns raised about the abovementioned decrees. Asked in a Jan. 21, 2021 interview whether the decrees pertaining to the judicial system did not constitute an infringement by the executive branch on the authorities of the judiciary branch, and would not adversely affect the elections, P.A. Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh replied that, after the elections, the new PLC will be able to amend and even cancel any presidential decree, but ignored the question of the decrees’ impact on the elections themselves.[19]
S. Schneidmann is a research fellow at MEMRI, where this article first appeared.
[1] Lab.pna.ps, March 2, 2021.
[2] Qudsn.net, March 6, 2021. This decree has yet to be published in the PA’s official gazette.
[3] For example, on February 20 ‘Abbas issued a decree ordering to stop political arrests and allow freedom of political action ahead of the elections (Wafa.ps, February 20, 2021). Palestinian human rights organizations state that the decree has not been implemented, and that political freedoms in both the West Bank and Gaza are only deteriorating. (Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, London, February 25, 2021).
[4] Lab.pna.ps, March 2, 2021.
[5] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), March 6, 2021.
[6] Icspr.ps, March 4, 2021.
[7] Icspr.ps, March 6, 2021.
[8] Ichr.ps, March 4, 2021.
[9] Alhaq.org, March 3, 2021.
[10] Pngoportal.org, March 4, 2021.
[11] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), March 7, 2021.
[12] Pflp.ps, March 4, 2021.
[13] Safa.news, March 7, 2021.
[14] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1433, “Fatah-Hamas Schism Widens Further Following Ruling By Palestinian Authority Constitutional Court—Established By Palestinian Authority President Abbas—To Disband Palestinian Legislative Council,” Jan. 22, 2019.
[15] Wafa.ps, Jan. 11-12, 2021. Among those forced into early retirement were even some relatively young judges, such as Ahmad Al-Ashqar. Facebook.com/100000112317816, Jan. 14, 2021.
[16] The latest decrees issued by Abbas only increased the Bar Association’s determination to continue this campaign, which includes the boycott of bodies which were established, or whose members were appointed, by an Abbas presidential decree, such as the High Judicial Council. Facebook.com/Palestinebar, Jan. 17, 2021; March 6, 2021.
[17] Such as ‘Adli Sadeq, identified with the camp of Muhammad Dahlan. Al-Arab (London), January 16, 25, 2021.
[18] As part of understandings with Hamas and the Palestinian factions, and in order to allay these concerns, on March 1, 2021 Abbas issued a decree establishing an elections court, comprising judges from both the West Bank and Gaza, whose function will be to resolve electoral disputes. However, it seems that Palestinian jurists are already in disagreement about its authorities and whether or not it is subordinate to the High Judicial Council and Constitutional Court. For example, jurist Samer Najm Al-Din contends that the electoral court’s rulings can be appealed before the High Judicial Council, whereas jurist Ahmad Al-Khaled believes that the electoral court’s rulings are final. Qudsn.net, March 1, 2021.
[19] Alaraby.com, Jan. 21, 2021.