Israel’s magnificent operations last week eliminated and/or incapacitated thousands of Hezbollah terrorists, as well as eliminated members of the Radwan force who were planning an “Oct. 7-style” attack on Israeli citizens in the Galilee. Finally receiving their just desserts were two men wanted by the FBI for the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 247 Americans, 57 French servicemen and six civilians. (The second terrorist was taken out on the 40th anniversary of the attack.)
There was no “thank you” from the Biden-Harris administration. After a bit of stiffness, the administration admitted that “nobody sheds a tear” for them.
But when lukewarm acceptance is followed by “That said … ,” you know Israel is in trouble. White House Middle East czar Brett McGurk added, “We have disagreements with the Israelis on tactics and how you kind of measure escalation risk. It is a very concerning situation. … We want a diplomatic settlement to the north. That is the objective, and that’s what we’re working towards.”
Now, for context.
While Israel was doing what it did—ensuring that the leadership of Hezbollah is incapacitated and likely not planning to answer the phone in the near future—Houthi terrorists shot down two U.S. Reaper drones in the Red Sea.
The Reapers cost $30 million each, but the real impact of the attack is the exposure of the futility of the U.S. language of “deterrence,” “defense” and “diplomatic settlement.”
The attack, like all Red Sea attacks, was blamed on “Israel’s war in Gaza.” But, in fact, it was part of a continuing stream of terrorist activities since the Houthis seized the northern part of Yemen, overthrowing the internationally recognized government in 2014. Between 2015 and 2021, they launched 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones at Saudi Arabia, killing 59 Saudi civilians.
A 2019 Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia damaged critical oil facilities. They shot down Reaper drones in 2017 and 2019, leading then-President Donald Trump to list them as a terror organization in 2020.
They were delisted by U.S. President Joe Biden in February 2021.
The Biden administration announced the delisting in diplo-speak: “This decision has nothing to do with our view of the Houthis and their reprehensible conduct, including attacks against civilians and the kidnapping of American citizens. We are committed to helping Saudi Arabia defend its territory against further such attacks.”
So, why delist them?
Because the Houthi war in Yemen and against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was and remains a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Sunni states. Which, parenthetically, tells you what you need to know about the Abraham Accords and what you need to know about Biden-Harris policy toward Iran.
In 2022, the Houthis launched a series of attacks, including a missile attack on the UAE that damaged a construction site at the international airport and also caused a fire at an oil depot that killed three migrant workers. The war continued through 2022 and 2023, well before Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza on Oct. 27, 2023.
The U.S. State Department returned the Houthis to the terror list in January, noting: “This designation seeks to promote accountability for the group’s terrorist activities. If the Houthis cease their attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the United States will re-evaluate this designation.”
They did not cease. Houthis have been regularly attacking international shipping and downed Reaper drones in April and two more in September. Revenues for the Suez Canal (important to our ally Egypt) dropped by 64.3% to approximately $337.8 million, compared to $648 million in May 2023, and cargo volume was down 68.5% from a year earlier.
Back to Hezbollah.
What you take away from a dive into Houthi terror is that Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups are not speaking the same language the U.S. State Department speaks. Words like “de-escalation,” “deterrence” and “diplomatic settlement” mean no more to Hezbollah than they do to the Houthis. Or to Hamas. Or to their sponsor, financier and puppet master, Iran.
After Israel eliminated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, the White House’s national security communications director, John Kirby, called for intense diplomacy, “We don’t want to see an escalation.” Department of Defense press secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said, “We’re trying to send a message, which is we’re looking to de-escalate the situation.”
The message might as well have been written in Martian.
Iran’s forces have spent years poised for war—planning and preparing for it, venerating it and periodically, when they think the price is one they can afford, executing it. Their language is the language of war.
When Israel responds militarily, including pre-emptively, Israel is speaking their language.
The United States has a built-in advantage in this situation, one that is often ignored. If diplomacy and de-escalation fail, which it has for us in many places around the world, we leave. In our wake, we have left Vietnamese civilians, Lebanese civilians, Iraqi civilians, Afghan civilians, Syrian Kurdish civilians and more.
We can go home. Israel is home.