With the building of the land corridor from Iraq to Syria, Iran has reached a new stage in its expansionist plan for colonizing or tributizing the region. Tehran has grown close to Baghdad; the militias it backs are now part of the Iraqi army, and Iran is also now receiving oil from Kirkuk fields expropriated from the Kurds. Though formal delivery was delayed by security concerns, Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iran-backed militia, recently shut down investigation into oil smuggling from Iraq to Iran. The defense pact between Baghdad and Riyadh brokered by the United States did nothing to stop the spread of Shi’a influence, with pro-Iran and Iranian forces building schools and universities in Sunni Areas, while Baghdad made an effort to Arabize the Kurdish region. With the US forces in Iraq under an increasing pressure to withdraw, and the US role in the region passive, reactive, and overtly capitulating to the Russian and Iranian advances, the anti-Terror Quartet (KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain), most strongly opposed to such developments have been looking into optimizing their existent agreements with Iraq and looking for a regional solution to Iranian aggression.
They can no longer depend on the US to resolve all (or any) crises; the Trump administration has been mired in dealing with domestic issues and struggling to get European allies on board with any substantive changes to JCPOA, much less any strong action to counter Iran beyond that. The Saudis came up with the seemingly unthinkable solution: to reach out to the Iraq with the full intent of building a relationship with a foundation beyond the superficial and largely symboliq defense agreement.
This is symbolism, but symbolism of the highest order and a very positive development. The Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman will supposedly visit Iraq and not just Iraq but the Shia holy city of Najaf. Given traditionally anti-Shia positions by the Saudi Wahhabis, this is important. Aside from historically taking bigoted religious positions against Shias (and against non-Muslims for that matter) for years, the Wahhabis notoriously raided the neighboring Shia holy city of Karbala in 1802 putting thousands of men, women and children to the sword as “infidels.” So this seems like a bold statement.”
This means a couple of things:
First, the Crown Prince seems dedicated to moving away from the Wahhabist fundamentalist position on dealing with Shi’a, and shows an interest in demonstrating that Saudi Arabia, in its capacity as a Guardian of Mecca and Medina, is open to Shi’a Muslims and will treat them with respect, if not equality. That position contrasts not only with the traditional regional rivalry between Sunnis and Shi’as, but between the current attitude in Iraq, where under pressure from Iran, the separation between Shi’as and Sunnis has increased to the point of enmity. Part of Iran’s strategy has been to use an aggressive form of Khomeinist Shi’ism heavily influenced by radical revolutionary approach to recruit and radicalize Shi’a groups in various states. Showing openness where Iran exploited previous bigotry and disinterest may inocculate Iraqis against that approach. A similar approach, coupled with an articulated commitment to interfaith tolerancehas already attracted a great deal of positive attention earlier this month when Mohammed bin Salman met the head of the Coptic Church in Egypt inside a cathedral, surrounded by Christian insignia.
Second, this effort provides an affirmative alternative to Iran’s aggressive movement. Iran is not beyond coopting Sunnis, particularly revolutionary and jihadist groups, when it means clearing the path and undermining its enemies, but discriminates against its own Sunni citizens. In addition to suffering through incitement and propaganda, they frequently have their worship sites profaned or raided, and on occasion prevented from celebrating holidays. (In some circles, that has led to a reactive embrace of Salafism, which Iran, at one point, encouraged among the Kurds, as part of its divide and conquer strategy).
And many of the Sunnis in Iraq remain in displacement camps, having suffered heavily during the war. They feel abandoned by the government and threatened by Iran’s involvement in backing the Shi’a portion of population. Engagement with Iraqi Shi’as may send a signal of protection and relief to the Sunni Iraqis. Those Shi’as who have felt threatened by the allegations of Saudi discrimination against their own Shi’a minorities (which in turn has likewise been heavily backed by Iran) may see this move as a step to diffuse tensions, and, in forming a possibility of dialogue, may in the future, not feel pressured to accept Iran’s dubiously motivated and self-interested backing.
However, the Iraq visit is about projecting hard power as much as it is about soft influence. One of the central issues on the table will be the inaugural opening of an existing Saudi embassy in Baghdad. Likewise, the Saudis are opening a new consulate in Najaf and in Basra (in addition to the one in Erbil), and inaugurating a border crossing at Arar. On top of that, a high-level delegation of various officials will also engage in discussions related to economics and investments, and sign a variety of agreements, intended to strengthen the relations between the two countries far beyond the defense agreement. Their focus on Iraq comes precisely at the moment when Iran is signalling that the country is basically in its pockets. Most recently, Iran claimed an East Maysan field, stating that the field is Iran’s rather than Iraq’s.
Throughout the campaign against Kurds, Iranian forces wearing Iraqi militia uniforms assisted in the effort of taking over Kirkuk, and Qassem Soleimani visited the country on multiple occasions. For that reason, Saudi soft influence in Southern Iraq may be making Iran nervous – as it should. Saudi presence in Iraq challenges Iran’s power play the same way Iran’s backing of terrorists groups – including the 116 jihadists recently arrested in Bahrain – pressures the Sunni Gulf governments. Iraq has been claimed by Iran as its sphere of influence, though a significant portion of the country was opposed to such meddling. The campaign to pressure Iran extends beyond KSA’s visit. UAE recently agreed to help Baghdad with the rebuilding of an ancient mosque. The Gulf States, thus, are showing Tehran that more than one player can play the same game. Iran, however, remains committed to shaping Iraq’s political future. A few pet projects with Saudi Arabia are unlikely to reverse this course.
However, this sort of self-sufficient, positive, and peaceful initiative for relationship-building by the Saudis should be applauded and encouraged. In the long term, that is exactly what they should be doing if they want to minimize the impact of Iran’s aggression and project an alternative leadership with a vision that includes the diversity of regional voices and relies on building goodwill, rather than forcefeeding ideologies and fomenting divisions. That the United States is not there to provide backing and assistance is an additional impetus for the Saudis to lead by example and to avoid previous missteps. The relationship building with Iraq is likely to benefit the Saudis in several ways.
First, they will project a positive image of themselves both with the Iraqi government in the people. More than that, they are taking steps to lay ground for more substantive engagement, including, potentially, a long-term dialogue, more specific commitments, and investments, and public diplomacy. There is nothing to lose and everything to gain from opening up to other people, engaging them, and perhaps assisting with localized depoliticized problem solving, as well as civil society building, entrepreneurship, and the like. That sort of people-to-people contact translates into trust, mutual interest, and positive outcomes for everyone involved – culturally, socially, economically, and even politically. The key, of course, is not to be heavy-handed, and recognize that such an approach will take time to develop and perfect, and will have its ups and downs. Iraqi sectarianism is but one of the many obstacles to overcome. How will the Saudis deal with the disenfranchised Kurds who just recently got back the ability to launch international flights – but under tight federal control, which breeds additional resentment? Just as importantly, will Mohammed bin Salman resist the temptation to build Salafi-affiliated mosques and centers to counter Iranian influence? Will the soft influence go in line with the purported vision of modernization and a more moderate Islam or will Iraq turn into yet another battleground of the painfully familiar extremist forces?
Second, they are taking the battle much closer to Iran’s turf, challenging the narrative of Arab state passivity in light of Iran’s takeover. It is a courageous and creative way of addressing a situation, where the United States has basically given up, and where Iran has already established a significant foothold along with Russia, and assorted terrorist groups. Iran will scramble to formulate a response, without also alienating its loyal ally. And it positions them as a leader in the region, not merely as a desperate state looking for assistance in Yemen or vis-a-vis Qatar. Saudis are sending a signal that they are ready to take the offensive and to go after Iran directly.
They are also showing resourcefulness and strength, and for the first time in a while may reverse the sense of uncertainty that caused many of the countries in the region to not follow them on the issue of Qatar or other major geopolitical development. This step also may earn respect of the United States, which, while recognizing Saudi Arabia as one of the pillars of its National Security Strategy in the Middle East, has been reluctant to get involved with too much assistance. Will the US strategy change under the incoming Secretary of State and former CIA director Pompeo:? That remains to be seen. On the one hand, Pompeo is considered to be more hawkish on Iran than the outgoing Rex Tillerson. On the other hand, Pompeo-led CIA was on the same page as the Pentagon, and the State Department with respect to US policy in Iraq and elsewhere in the region and backed inaction. For that reason, developing a new strategy is a smart move.
Third, this visit will go a long way towards rehabilitating the Saudi image, tarnished by decades of a terrible human rights record, corruption, support for Wahhabism in the very recent past, as well as the one-sided coverage of the Saudi role in Yemen, and Qatari and Iranian propaganda in the West. Positive relationship-building is much admired by the international community, as well as NGOs and the Western press, always on the look out for the feel-good stories to gush about. Still, the Saudis are facing an uphill battle, because the initial meeting, which will draw some positive attention, will not do much for them unless it is folllowed by consistent supportive action, and equally consistent, informative, and substantive coverage of the agreements between the two countries, and what positive and measurable effects these investments and other developments will have on the lives of the regular people from a variety of backgrounds. For that reason, the Saudis should treat this effort seriously, and beware lest their step towards engagement be interpreted as window dressing to spite Iran.
Mohammed bin Salman and his delegation should also be on guard about the likely repercussions of this visit. Iran will certainly not be pleased. For a rising geopolitical hegemon, client states are a zero sum game. More than direct reprisals and heated rhetoric in the press, however, the Islamic Republic will view this encroachment on its territory as an open challenge and an invitation to up the ante in the influence peddling of its own. For that reason, whatever pressure the Saudis may be applying to Tehran’s interests, Tehran will likely reciprocate wherever possible and in whatever ways it finds the most effective, most likely going after Saudi interests in the region or abroad, either directly or through proxies, and wooing Saudi client states with additional fervor.
That said, the Saudis should keep in mind that Iran’s ultimate strategic success is in the art of deception. Iraq may very well be trying to play it both ways, just as it did with the United States for a very long time, and just as Qatar managed to do, while continuously benefiting Iran. Iran masterfully uses its proxies to spy on its adversaries, score diplomatic points, and deceive the West into perceiving its own weaknesses and vulnerabilities, or overestimating the independence of its proxies. Baghdad may be using this opportunity to clean up its image with the West, and to appear less dependent on Iran than what has been coming out in recent months. The decision to lift the flight embargo on Kurds, for instance, came at a heavy cost to their autonomy.
The agreements with Saudis which will benefit their ambitions will likewise come with a price, yet to be determined. Iraq PR machinery, for instance, has been churning out articles that Iraq has gotten Iranian militias under control – in an effort to show that Abadi, not Khamenei is really the boss. That effort is again aimed at the West, though few people are fooled at this point. Simultaneously, Baghdad may be trying to play off Saudis against Iran, just as it previously did with Iran and the United States, before finally firmly moving into the Iranian camp. If so, it is only a matter of time before Baghdad, after getting everything it can possibly squeeze out of KSA and UAE, betrays them both, causing additional security headaches, sowing chaos, undermining their best efforts, and making them out to be weak, naive, and foolish. For that reason, Saudi efforts should be guarded and rest on specific demands at each point in the growing relationship.
The other issue for concern is security. By opening up to Iraq, and building more diplomatic outposts, the Saudis are creating additional vulnerabilities in a highly factionalized environment. The resurgence of ISIS is but once concern; ISIS so far has not made it as far as Erbil – but if it sufficiently destabilizes Kirkuk and Hawija, it may yet spread elsewhere once again. Second, the Saudis should not rule out the repetition of the events when the Saudi embassy in Iran was attacked by a violent mob, directed and encouraged by the government. If all else fails for Iran with respect to discouraging Saudis in Iraq, open violence through militias or incitement of the local Shi’as, may be used in such a manner. Finally, there is the very strong consideration that the Saudi diplomatic effort are a long shot, and in the best case scenario will take years to develop to the degree that they make a substantive difference. These steps are certainly not a substitute for rolling back Iran’s substantive influence in the immediate future.
Down the road, the Saudis may slow down Iran’s march through the Middle East, if what they offer to the governments, and just as importantly, the local populations, proves to be more worthwhile than the promises and the soft influence Iran is providing (this will happen, if Saudis target ALL segments of Iraqi population, not just preferred and convenient groups). But soft power is a complement to the projection of hard power, and if Saudis really want to do more than create temporary hindrance’s in Iran’s path to dominating the region, if they want to reverse the course altogether, they will need to start backing Iraqis, including Kurds, against Iran, in a way that does not further empower ISIS or various Salafists groups.
They will also need to separate the Iraqi Shi’as from Iranian influenc, perhaps by demonstrating that to Iranians, in the long run, these people are merely proxies for the killing, and that they will never be treated as equal in any future empire. And, they will need to disrupt and destroy Iranian land corridor and various other operations, and to provide their own security recourse to Baghdad and regional groups to battle terrorists. For now, Baghdad has the excuse of Iran and its militias helping out against ISIS. Mohammed bin Salman needs to figure out a way of depriving them of that excuse. By cutting off Iraq from Syria, he may eventually succeed in blocking the flow of Iranians into Syria, weaken Assad, and find a path towards a transition from the current nightmare. But all of it will take time. Do Saudis have the benefit of time? No. But they are trying. And their valiant attempt is deserving of support.