China’s Hegemony in Africa Benefits Russia and Iran

At first glance, China’s neo-colonialist economic expansionism throughout Africa is just another aspect of China’s self serving policies, which, coupled with frequent inability to finish what was started does more harm than good, but is not bellicose or particularly threatening. Then why did Senator Ted Cruz file another amendment to the United States National Defense Authorization Act this week, requiring a reporting for China’s activities in Djibouti? The amendment states:

Briefing on China’s Activities in Djibouti: Sen. Cruz’s amendment would require briefings from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to on China’s continued efforts to expand their influence in Djibouti and the surrounding region and to cause harm to our service members.

China’s new military base in Djibouti, it appears, has been about a lot more than defensive posturing a hotly contested area. China has also started training its troops in offensive maneuvers, has been caught building backdoors in cyber infrastructure to spy on the African Union, and has also used blinding lasers to disorient US military aircraft in Djibouti, where the US also has a base. In fact, the US has had to ground its aircraft after multiple such attacks.

These lasers allegedly have caused minor eye damage and shaking to the US pilots.  Furthermore, AFRICOM’s Major General Thomas Waldhauser warned that China’s expanding military power in Africa could affect US strategic interests, such as limiting or targeting US supplies coming through the port in Djibouti. So far, however, the US has not focused on the possible growing threat, instead spending more resources on joint counterterrorism operations in West Africa. The US has filed a complaint over China’s alleged use of the lasers, but China dismissed the allegations. The base in the strategically located Djibouti, which connects Africa to the Middle East and overlooks the HOrn of Africa, creating connections to the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, and North Africa,  also sparked US concerns about cyberespionage and Chinese interference in sensitive operations. Aside from the use of drones which could interfere with US military operations, China has strategically used soft influence to curtail US influence and involvement in the Phillipines, which is no longer opposed to China’s aggressive posturing towards its Pacific neighbors. There is concern that CHina’s growing military and economic involvement in Africa could pose a similar threat.

Indeed, China’s presence in Djibouti facilitates the mixing of commerical and military interests. Part of China’s interest in Djibouti is in the building of a blue-water navy. In that respect, her strategy of expanding naval presence potentially around the world mirrors Iran’s rising ambitions. Part of the reason is commercial – China is looking towards expanding a maritime trade route that will need to be protected, a New Silk Road to Africa that would align with its Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI).  However, China is also looking to develop pipelines, ports, and other central infrastructural projects, as well as potentially military bases in a number of other countries, including Pakistan, Myanmar, Seychelles, or Sri Lanka. Naval Bases and control of ports would give China unprecedented access to strategic waterways in the regions and bring Beijing one step closer towards the domination of the seas and the creation of a network of tributary;/vassal states that would support China’s regional hegemony.

Aside from China’s existing Special Economic Zone, China is looking to build two more. These two zones are perceived to be as hostile to Djibouti’s government and national sovereignty, sparking outrage. In the meantime, France is looking to supply the government with French military equipment with the financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. In response to China’s recent increase in weapons in the South China Sea, and transfer of arms and troops to the artificial islands, France had increased its naval presence in the area. France sees many portions of Africa as its own sphere of interests, and has recently been bulking up its direct presence in the area. Along with the United States, France is part of a growing counterterrorism bulwark in West Africa and the Sahel; it has strong ties to North Africa, particularly to Morocco, and has a base of its own in Djibouti. China’s presence is likewise perceived as a threat to France’s own interests; however, the escalating tensions with Beijing are not the only motive for Macron’s more active approach.

Iran has been seeking access to Djibouti to build its own base. Due to the presence of the Arab Gulf States and the US, the country has not been particularly welcoming to Tehran, which has had to suffice with a part in Eritrea and Somalia for its access to Yemen and other parts of the Middle East. Tehran’s recent attempt to destabilize Morocco with the help of the African Hezbullah training the separatist Polisario operatives, was likewise nipped in the bud. But Djibouti, which welcomes bases from all over the world, is a much-wanted prize for the Islamic Republic. Fragmentation of the country thanks to China’s controversial economic policies is a clear path towards destabilization and exploitation by extremists, as well as other hegemonic state actors, such as Iran and Russia.

Djibouti is heavily dependent on China’s investment capital, although Beijing’s heavy handed approach resulted in growing tensions.  On the other hand, China, along with a number of African governments, envisions Djibouti’s port as a future African trade gateway.  Beijing has been assisting a number of states with developing their own business, and has been working out a Port of Mombasa-Nairobi railway run to Uganda.  China is looking to also potentially connect Khartoum and Addis Ababa, creating a link between the Mediterranean Sea and Addis Ababa. This would ease trade and trasportation, for a number of different countries down the line, though only China directly benefits from the process of construction, importing her own workers, rather than giving jobs to the locals. China is also considering building a bridge, between Djibouti and Nigeria, the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti. The bridge could be in part connected with tunnels and contribute to China’s vision of a Greater Silk Road.

China could also build up a number of deep water ports, in East Africa.  On the surface, all of these options appear greatly beneficial to all involved. The reality on the ground, however, is different.  Many of the projects China takes on are never completed and waste money and labor, while blocking the possibility of necessary infrastructural developments. China has at times simply did not have access to the sufficient amount of funding necessary for the sheer scale of its plans. On the other hand,  partially completed or poorly managed projects are likely to be coopted, subverted, or otherwise exploited by rogue actors, such as terrorists, or China’s rivals in Africa, specifically Iran. Russia does not yet have sufficient funding to benefit the African states with infrastructural developments on such scale. However, it has been aggressively moving to found relationships based in defense agreements and arms trade, something many weaker and corrupt states yearn for, especially in the event China becomes too patronizing and demanding – which is already the case in some parts of the continent.

Meanwhile China continues with its plans, building a dock that could be used to welcome its ships. Iran is one of China’s closest trade partners, particularly with respect to oil. Could China facilitate Iran’s presence in Djibouti and elsewhere, and utilize its military base for helping Tehran smuggle arms, spies, troops, and assorted contraband? Likewise China is constructing an anti-piracy facility near its base, supposedly to guard peace and stability in the region. However it also means, that China would be more heavily armed than what would normally be expected of a largely commercial presence. China and a local company have agreed to build a cross-country pipeline; China will benefit from the gas-related deals, finding additional sources of energy and benefiting from the trade. Just as Djibouti is overly dependent on China and likely to be manipulated and pressured by Beijing, the small country is also heavily dependent on Ethiopia, which in itself is in part an ally to Iran.

Iran, along with Turkey, and Qatar, have been known to stroke tensions over a major dam between Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Cairo. Ethiopia offers business opportunity to Tehran, particularly in light of the expanding post-JCPOA sanctions.  The Islamic Republic is looking to stave off Egyptian, UAE, and Saudi influences inside the country and to make its own presence more central. China’s infrastructural projects complement and facilitate this gambit. Ethiopian economic policy is heavily influenced by the Chinese approach. China seems to have a hand in advising the government, and is in a position to open doors for Tehran and other states looking to move into Africa, so look as their immediate interests do not clash.

Indeed, Ethiopia has become known as the “China of Africa“, but it also mirrors China’s partnerships. It’s no wonder that Tehran’s entrance into the neighborhood has been relatively painless.  That’s not to say that Ethiopia does not continue to benefit from its business ties with UAE and other countries seeking to oppose Iranian influence. To that extent, Ethiopia has been able to play off these sides against one another. Yet, one needs to look towards China to see who is likely to win this game. And to the extent that China would like to minimize business risk and limit its investments – Ethiopian government is deeply in debt – Iran, which is looking towards deals more so than investments, and for whom prosperity is less important than regional influence, is the natural descendant to step in.

Iran is a central piece of China’s BRI strategy; China’s interest in Tehran is not limited to trade. For that reason, their level of cooperation is close and strategic, in Africa, just as much as inside the Islamic Republic itself, where Beijing has been “contracted” to help modernize the railway systems and other projects. As the Gulf Crisis expands into East and West Africa, and Turkey, Qatar, and Iran work increasingly closer together to woo African governments and terrorist organizations vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, the Emiratis, and Egypt, China is positioned to be the dealmaker, and perhaps, a dealbreaker, central to these tensions. On the one hand, doing business amidst the escalating conflict, which may blow up into proxy attacks among various militias and governments, may be risky for China’s investments and other interests. On the other hand, as a major player looking to mix its military muscle, Beijing may have a decisive role to play. For now, it is not yet directly taking sides in the conflict, as it looks to maintain stable business relations with everyone involved.

If push comes to shove, however, although Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, have been utilizing divisive tactics to sow discord, they may be more amenable to China’s vision in light of Iran’s strategic location, and disinterest in competing with any of the three states for religious influence. If anything, China’s pragmatic approach, backed by Communist economic system is closer in line to Iran than to any of the other states. And in the event Iran succeeds to close the Strait of Hormuz, which is one of its own geopolitical ambitions, China will not be left out in the cold thanks to the growing security cooperation between the two countries.  While Iran is key for China’s multi-pronged strategy to reach the world markets, China is key for Iran’s independence from the West, in that it is not only a non-judgmental partner in trade, but an ally towards potentially winning over the African states, that are being pressured by Iran’s Gulf rivals to oppose its influence. Recent accusations of espionage by the African Union somewhat dampened that special relationship with China. However, US is not present in the region to offer an alternative in investments, infrastructure, and partnerships; Israel is moving in to provide some relief through green energy projects and humanitarian aid and skill building; however, Israel’s presence and resources are for now limited compared to Beijing’s.

Amidst this chaos, Russia is quietly building up defense and arms-trade based relationships with both pro-Iran and pro-Saudi countries in the region. Russia and China have divergent interests on many fronts, but China’s, rather than US dominance in Africa, is much preferable to President Putin, and for now, the countries are pursuing parallel directions without directly conflicting over influence. However, it has also backed pro-Iran states against openly pro-Western states such as Morocco, which, while still closer to the KSA than to Iran, maintain their own independent foreign policy and seek to lead the region in an alternative to external influencers of all stripes. MOrocco’s rise imperil’s Russia’s deal-cutting, influence, and close coordination with Iran to gain control of various spheres of influence. For that reason, Russia will back Algeria, its old Soviet ally over a country that is a close ally of the United States, promotes more liberal agendas in the region, and will likely to be more of a competitor to Russia than a partner. CHina, in the meantime, is building as if there is no tomorrow, while attaching significant strings, including expectations of loyalty from various states, alarming the United States, which does not wish to see the entire continent fall under the influence of Beijing.

Djibouti is just the tip of the iceberg but one that clearly illustrates China’s overall strategy in Africa and approach to the world. Furthermore, China’s presence in Djibouti provides key to understanding other conflicts and parallel hegemons’ and their relations to China and to the continent. None of them bode well for US security or interests in Africa or the Middle East. It is in this context that Senator Cruz’s amendment should be viewed as an important first step towards increasing US understanding of the threats its facing from the power-seeking hegemons in Africa and regaining control of the situation at some point.