Though significant, connections between Palestinian Arab statehood and nuclear war remain generally ignored. For Israel, the seemingly discrete perils of war with Iran and Palestinian Arab statehood are potentially intertwined and mutually reinforcing. This means that continuing to treat these issues as separate security problems could represent an especially grievous policy error.
There are variously clarifying particulars. Once established, a Palestinian state could tilt the balance of power between Israel and Iran. For the moment, there is no law-based Palestinian state (i.e., no Palestinian Arab satisfaction of authoritative requirements delineated at the Montevideo Convention of 1934). But if there should sometime come a point where Palestinian statehood and a direct war with Iran would coincide, the effects could prove determinative. In a worst case scenario, the acceleration of competitive risk-taking in the region would enlarge the risks of unconventional warfare.
For the moment, any direct war between Israel and Iran would be fought without any “Palestine variable.” Ironically, however, one more-or-less plausible outcome of such a war would be more pressure on Israel to accept yet another enemy state. To be sure, Iran’s leaders are unconcerned about Palestinian Arab well-being per se, but even a continuously faux commitment to Palestinian statehood would strengthen their overall power position.
Additionally, any formal creation of “Palestine” would be viewed in Tehran as a favorable development regarding wars fought against Israel. While nothing scientifically meaningful can be said about an unprecedented scenario (in logic and mathematics, true probabilities must always be based upon the determinable frequency of pertinent past events), there are persuasive reasons to expect that “Palestine” would become a reliably belligerent proxy of Iran.
A “Two-State Solution” would enlarge not “only” the jihadist terror threat to Israel (conventional and unconventional), but also prospects for major regional war. Even if such a war were fought while Iran was still pre-nuclear, it could still use radiation dispersal weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) against Israel and/or target the Dimona nuclear reactor with conventional rockets. In a worst case scenario, Iran’s already nuclear North Korean ally would act in direct belligerency against the Jewish State.
In these complex strategic assessments, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations ought never be confined to “general principles.” Rather, variously specific issues will need to be addressed head-on: borders; Jerusalem; relations between Gaza and the “West Bank;” the Cairo Declaration of June 1974 (an annihilationist “phased plan”); the Arab “right of return” and cancellation of the “Palestine National Charter” (which still calls unambiguously and unapologetically for the eradication of Israel “in stages”).
Not to be overlooked by any means, any justice-based plan would need to acknowledge the historical and legal rights of the Jewish people in Judea and Samaria. Such an acknowledgment would represent an indispensable corrective to lawless Hamas claims of “resistance by any means necessary” and to genocidal Palestinian calls for “liberating” all territories “from the river to the sea.” On its face, the unhidden Palestinian Arab expectation is that Israel would become part of “Palestine”. But this ought not to come as any surprise. All Islamist/Jihadist populations already regard Israel as “occupied Palestine.”
“Everything is very simple in war,” warns classical Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz in On War, “but the simplest thing is still very difficult.” American presidents have always insisted that regional peace be predicated on Arab recognition of the Jewish people’s right to security in their own sovereign nation- state.
Concurrently, most Arab leaders in the Middle East secretly hope for a decisive Israeli victory over Hamas in Gaza and over Hezbollah in Lebanon. For these leaders, Hamas represents a foreseeably unmanageable scion of the Egyptian “Moslem Brotherhood” and Hezbollah a terror-surrogate of Shiite and non-Arab “Persia.”
What about North Korea and future Middle Eastern war? Pyongyang has a documented history of active support for Iran and Syria. Regarding ties with Damascus, it was Kim Jung Un who built the Al Kibar nuclear reactor for the Syrians at Deir al-Zor. This is the same facility that was preemptively destroyed by Israel in its “Operation Orchard” (also known in certain Israeli circles as “Operation Outside the Box”) on September 6, 2007.
For Israel, nuclear weapons, doctrine and strategy will remain essential to national survival. In this connection, the country’s traditional policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” or “bomb in the basement” should promptly be updated. The key objective of such dramatic changes would be more credible Israeli nuclear deterrence, a goal that will correlate closely with “selective nuclear disclosure.” Despite being counter-intuitive, Iran will need to become convinced that Israel’s nuclear arms are not too destructive for purposeful operational use. Here, in an arguably supreme irony, the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent could vary inversely with its presumed destructiveness.
In order for Israel to construct theory-based nuclear policies, not policies that are merely visceral, ad hoc or “seat-of-the-pants” creations, Iran should be considered a rational foe. It remains conceivable that Iran would sometime act irrationally, perhaps in alliance with other more-or-less rational states (e.g., Syria, North Korea) or with kindred terror groups (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Houthi).
In any event, such altogether realistic prospects should never be dealt with in Washington or Jerusalem as matters of “common sense.” In existential security matters, Israel doesn’t need more common sense. It needs disciplined and dialectical thought.
What about non-Arab Pakistan? Unless Jerusalem were to consider Pakistan a genuine enemy, Israel has no present-day nuclear foes. Still, as an unstable Islamic state, Pakistan is subject to coup d’état by assorted Jihadist elements and is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia. At some point, the Sunni Saudi kingdom could decide to “go nuclear” itself, in large part because of Iran’s “Shiite” nuclear program.
Would such a decision by Riyadh represent a net gain or net loss for Israel?
It’s not too soon to ask this question.
For Israeli nuclear deterrence to work longer-term, Iran will need to be told more rather than less about Israel’s nuclear targeting doctrine and about the invulnerability of Israel’s nuclear forces/infrastructures. In concert with such changes, Jerusalem will also need to clarify its still opaque “Samson Option.” The point of such clarifications would not be to suggest Israel’s willingness to “die with the Philistines,” but to enhance the “high destruction” pole of its nuclear deterrence continuum.
If the next US president maintains America’s support of Palestinian statehood,[1] Iran will more likely consider certain direct conflict options vis-à-vis Israel. At some point in these considerations, Israel could need to direct explicit nuclear threats (counter-value and/or counter-force) toward the Islamic Republic. As policy, this posture could represent a “point of no return.”
For Israel, the unprecedented risks of Palestinian statehood could prove irreversible and irremediable. These risks would likely be enlarged if they had to be faced concurrent with an Israel-Iran war. It follows that Jerusalem’s core security obligation should be to keep Iran non–nuclear and to simultaneously prevent Palestinian statehood. From the standpoint of authoritative international law, meeting this two-part obligation would be in the combined interests of counter-terrorism, nuclear war-avoidance and genocide prevention. Prime facie, meeting this overriding obligation would be in the interests of regional and global justice.
—————-
LOUIS RENÉ BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is Professor (Emer.) of International Law at Purdue. Born in Zürich at the end of World War II, he writes extensively on world politics, law, literature and philosophy and is a member of the Oxford University Press Editorial Advisory Board for the annual Yearbook on International Law and Jurisprudence. He is also a six-times contributor to this publication, including lead articles, and has been published at Horasis (Zurich); Jurist; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; global-e (U. of California); Yale Global Online; Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); International Security (Harvard); World Politics (Princeton); The Atlantic; The New York Times; Israel National News; US News & World Report; Air-Space Operations Review (USAF); The Brown Journal of World Affairs; Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College; Modern War Institute (Pentagon); The War Room (Pentagon); BESA Perspectives (Israel); INSS (Israel); Israel Defense (Israel); The Hudson Review (New York) and others. His twelfth book, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, was published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2016 (2nd. ed., 2018)
[1] Supporters of a Palestinian state often argue that its prospective harms to Israel could be reduced or eliminated by expecting the new Arab state’s original “demilitarization.” For informed legal and diplomatic reasoning against this argument, see: Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would Not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Ambassador Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vo. 28., No.5., November 1995, pp. 959-972.