Abstract: As Israel expands its law-enforcing offensive against Gaza-based Hamas, core attention should remain directed toward terrorist patron state Iran. With such attention, Israel will need to draw upon a comprehensive strategy that is focused on both general strategic deterrence and the specific perils of Iranian nuclearization. In this connection, implementing a credible “Samson Option” would be required of Israel not for eventual nuclear warfighting, but to ensure that Tehran could not exploit crisis escalations to support terror-violence. Among other things, this would mean visibly greater Israeli reliance on “Samson” to maximize “escalation dominance” vis-à-vis any future crisis encounters with Iran. Key factors in explaining this “Samson” requirement would be (1) Israel’s limited “strategic depth;” and (2) its steadily-diminishing rationale for “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.”
“I mean to show you of my strength, yet greater;
As with amaze shall strike all who behold.”
John Milton, Samson Agonistes
In any rationality-based strategic calculus, the “Samson Option”[1] would refer not to any last-resort spasm of national vengeance, but to a specific set of purposeful threats. For now, when taken together with Israel’s still intentionally ambiguous nuclear strategy (an outdated doctrine commonly referred to as Israel’s “bomb in the basement”), these carefully fashioned threat postures could represent a net benefit to Israeli nuclear deterrence. To be authentically optimal, however, an Israeli “Samson Option” would need to (1) coincide with an incremental and selective end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity;” and (2) pertain to Iran directly, not to its terrorist proxies. There are no conceivable circumstances in which “Samson” could offer Israel any gainful or cost-effective applications to Hamas itself.
There will be relevant particulars, factors additional to what is presently taking place between Israel and Hamas. To wit, because strategic crises in other parts of the world could sometimes “spill over” into the rapidly-dissembling Middle East, strategic planners in Tel Aviv should move up and clarify their operational preparations to “think Samson.” This is especially the case wherever a plausible “spill over” could involve the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
What, exactly, is being suggested? As background, there can no scientifically-grounded assessment of probabilities because the many-sided events under consideration would be unprecedented or sui generis. In science, true probabilities can never be ascertained ex nihilo, out of nothing. They can only be drawn from the determinable frequency of pertinent past events.
These are not narrowly political or intuitive calculations. Aa an operationally meaningful concept, the Samson Option references a residual deterrence doctrine founded upon credible threats (whether implicit or explicit) of overwhelming nuclear retaliation or counter-retaliation – unconventional threats (ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu would call them “unorthodox”) to thwart more-or-less expected enemy aggressions. Reasonably, any such massive last-resort doctrine could enter into force only where such aggressions would imperil Israel’s continuance as a viable nation-state. In the absence of genuinely existential threats from Iran, Israel could more prudently rely upon an orthodox escalation “ladder.”
This argument can be crystallized. Considered as a potentially “final” element of strategic dissuasion, it would do Israel little good to proffer Samson-level threats in response to “ordinary” or less than massive forms of enemy attack. Even where the principal operational object for Israel would be “just” counter-terrorist success against Hamas, invoking “Samson” could make sense only vis-à-vis Hamas patron Iran. However, even in such more-or-less nuanced calculations, assumptions of rationality could always be problematic.[2]
There are further details. For Israel’s nuclear deterrent to work reliably against a still non-nuclear Iran, it is implausible that it would ever need to include a Samson Option. In any crisis between Israel and Iran involving Hamas (and potentially Hezbollah) terror, Israel could almost certainly achieve “escalation dominance”[3] without employing “Samson.” But if Iran were an already-nuclear adversary, still a realistic prospect, the Islamic Republic’s capacity to enhance Hamas terror capabilities would plausibly exceed any pre-nuclear constraints of competitive risk-taking. In these portentous circumstances, Samson could prove indispensable.
Israel’s basis for launching a preemptive strike against Iran without Samson could be rational only before that state actually turned nuclear. A foreseeable non-Samson plan for preemption would involve more direct Iranian involvement in the continuing terror war against Israel on behalf of Hamas and/or Hezbollah. By setting back Iranian nuclear efforts and infrastructures, such pre-Samson involvement could offer Israel an asymmetrical power advantage in the region – a state-saving opportunity to maintain supremacy amid the nation’s unceasing counter-terrorist wars. In essence,, this larger opportunity would be the result of Israel still not having to fear an Iran-initiated nuclear war.
There would be related matters of intra-crisis communications. As a useful element of any ongoing strategic dialogue, the basic message of any Israeli Samson Option would need to remain uniform and consistent. Always, it should signal to an adversary state, a clearly stated or suitably unstated promise of counter-city (“counter value”) nuclear reprisal. By definition, Israel should also avoid signaling to its Iranian adversary any intentionally sequential gradations of nuclear warfighting.[4]
The “bottom line” reasoning is as follows: For Israel, exercising a Samson Option threat is not likely to deter any contemplated Iranian aggressions short of nuclear and/or massively large-scale conventional (including biological) first strikes. Per se, this threat action could do little to prevent Iran from its continuously enthusiastic support of anti-Israel Jihadist terrorists.
Whatever the Samson Option’s precise goals, its key objective should remain constant. This objective must be to keep Israel “alive,” not “merely” prevent the always-beleaguered Jewish State from “dying alone” (a too literal conclusion that could be drawn erroneously from the Book Of Judges), In this peremptory or jus cogens objective,[5] Israeli policy should very intentionally and conspicuously deviate from the biblical Samson analogy.
Ultimately, for Israel, “Samson,” in all relevant military nuclear matters, should be about how best to manage certain urgent processes of strategic dissuasion.[6] Always, the primary objective of Israel’s nuclear forces should be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. For now, at least, Israel’s presumed nuclear strategy, while not yet articulated in any precise or publically ascertainable fashion, is oriented toward nuclear war avoidance, not nuclear war fighting.[7] From all prospectively concerning standpoints, including even the well-being of Israel’s Iranian state adversary, this represents the unambiguously correct orientation.[8]
All things considered, Samson’s overriding rationale should be to bring the following clear message to Iran and other potential attackers: “Israel may sometime have to accept mega-destructive attacks, but it will never allow itself to “die with the Philistines.” By emphasizing credible exposure prospects of existential harms – “Israel won’t die alone” – the Samson Option could continuously serve Israel as a persuasive adjunct to nuclear deterrence and more-or-less corollary preemption options.
There is more. The Samson Option could never protect Israel as a fully comprehensive nuclear strategy by itself. Therefore, this Option should never be confused with Israel’s more generalized or “broad spectrum” nuclear strategy, one that should always seek to maximize national deterrence at recognizably less apocalyptic levels of military engagement.[9]
At this point in any ongoing strategic dialectic,[10] certain derivative questions must be raised. How can the Samson Option best serve Israel’s more general strategic requirements? Although the primary mission of Israel’s undisclosed nuclear weapons should always be to preserve the Jewish State – not merely to wreak visceral havoc upon certain specific bitter foes when all else has seemingly been lost – any more obvious preparations for a Samson Option could still improve Israel’s nuclear deterrence and preemption capabilities.
In regard to the latter, Israeli resorts to presumptively conventional defensive strikes could prove permissible or law enforcing under authoritative international law.[11] In all such conceivable cases, therefore, the Israeli preemptions would express a jurisprudential counterpart to strategy. Formally, this counterpart is referred to as “anticipatory self-defense.”[12]
Concerning long-term Israeli nuclear deterrence, recognizable preparations for a Samson Option would help convince Iran or other designated enemy states that massive aggressions against Israel could never be gainful. This stance could prove especially compelling if Israel’s “Samson” weapons were to appear (1) coupled with some explicit level of nuclear disclosure (thereby effectively ending Israel’s longstanding posture of nuclear ambiguity); (2) sufficiently invulnerable to enemy first strikes; and (3) “counter city”/”counter-value” in declared mission function. Furthermore, in view of what nuclear strategists sometimes refer to as the “rationality of pretended irrationality,” Samson could more widely enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence by demonstrating a tangible Israeli willingness to take certain existential risks.
To a manifestly variable and possibly even bewildering extent, the nuclear deterrence benefits of “pretended irrationality” could sometimes depend upon prior enemy state awareness of Israel’s counter-city or counter-value targeting posture. Worth noting here is that such a posture had been expressly recommended some twenty years ago by the “Project Daniel Group” in its confidential report to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.[13]
Overall, in reference to prospectively needed strategies of preemption, Israeli preparations for a Samson Option, explicitly recognizable and not just sotto voce, could help convince Israel’s own leadership that defensive first strikes would be net gainful. These Israeli leaders could then expect that such conventional preemptive strikes[14] would be undertaken with reassuringly reduced expectations of any unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This optimistic expectation would depend upon (a) assorted prior Israeli decisions on nuclear disclosure; (b) Israeli perceptions of the effects of such disclosure on enemy retaliatory intentions; (c) Israeli judgments about enemy perceptions of Samson weapons vulnerability; and (d) a presumed Iranian awareness of Samson’s counter-city force posture.
In all cases concerning Samson and Israeli nuclear deterrence, any recognizable last-resort nuclear preparations could enhance Israel’s preemption options by underscoring a singularly bold national willingness to take certain presumptively existential risks.[15]
What about “pretended irrationality?” That complex calculus could become a double-edged sword.[16] Israel’s leaders should always remain mindful of this “rebound effect.” In essence, brandished too “irrationally,” Israeli preparations for a Samson Option, however unwittingly, could encourage enemy preemptions. This serious peril is underscored by expected pressures on each contending state party to achieve or maintain “escalation dominance.” Also significant in this unpredictable environment of competitive risk-taking could be either or both sides’ visible deployments of missile defenses.[17]
There is more. Either side’s efforts to reduce its own nuclear retaliatory force vulnerabilities could simultaneously incentivize the other side to more hurriedly strike first, in brief, to “preempt the preemption.” Here, in law, especially close attention would need to be directed toward the peremptory norm of “military necessity.”[18]
If left to themselves, neither deterred nor preempted, certain Islamic state enemies of Israel, especially Iran, could threaten to bring the Jewish State face-to-face with the torments of Dante’s Inferno, “Into the eternal darkness, into fire, into ice.”[19] Plausibly, such a portentous scenario has been made more credible by the latest geostrategic strengthening of Iran[20] in parts of Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. At some not too distant point, an expanding Iran-Hezbollah offensive (complementing the Iran-Hamas offensive in Gaza) could create existential perils for Israel. All such synergistic intersections would be taking place within the broadly uncertain context of “Cold War II.”[21]
In extremis atomicum, these hazards could sometime become so unique and formidable that employing a Samson Option would represent the best available strategic option for Israel. In the best of all possible worlds, of course, Israel would have no need to augment or even maintain its arsenal of deterrent threat options – especially the perilous nuclear components – but this ideal reconfiguration of world politics remains a long way off. Nonetheless, in the best of all possible worlds, Israel would have to collaborate toward the replacement of Realpolitik (power-politics) or “Westphalian” international politics,[22] an intellectual collaboration that would be based upon the long-delayed awareness that planet earth is inevitably an inter-dependent organic whole.
But the time for such replacement has not yet arrived. It follows that until such a desperately needed global transformation could plausibly be actualized, Jerusalem will need to prepare more visibly for a possible Samson Option. The point of this sobering imperative would not be to give preference to any actual application of Samson, but to best ensure that Israel could prudentially deter all survival-threatening enemy aggressions.
For Israel, the “Samson Option” ought never be about wreaking national vengeance.[23] Rather, it should be treated a residual but integral part of the country’s integrated nuclear deterrence doctrine. From the more specific standpoint of managing conflict with Hamas (and prospectively Hezbollah), Samson could provide operational nuclear deterrence benefits to Israel by placing suitable pressures on Iran. By signaling this terrorist-mentoring state that Israel can ultimately control all pertinent processes of conflict escalation (that is, achieve “escalation dominance”), Iran would be less likely to stand in tangible support of Sunni terrorist (Hamas) and Shiite terrorist (Hezbollah) aggressions. To enhance the credibility of such a necessary signal, Israel should immediately begin a controlled transition from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to selective nuclear disclosure.
To sum up, Israel is in protected conflict with Hamas, but can ultimately succeed in this conflict only by continuously weakening Iran. In the best case scenario, Iran would remain non-nuclear and Israeli management of Iranian terror support could stay within the conspicuous bounds of conventional deterrence. If, however, for one reason or another, Iran were permuted to cross the nuclear weapons threshold, Israel’s subsequent efforts at deterrence of Iran would become vastly more problematic. Plausibly, at that point, Israel would require a Samson Option in order to maintain escalation dominance.
There is, finally, an intermediate and potentially ironic scenario to consider. If Iran should get involved in direct military action against Israel before becoming an operationally nuclear state – an action that would almost certainly originate from Iran’s doctrinal support of Hamas and/or Hezbollah – Israel could find itself faced with an unforeseen strategic opportunity. This would mean a fully legitimate and law-enforcing opportunity to preemptively destroy Iranian nuclear infrastructures before they could be “online.” Though advancing such a belligerent scenario could create the false impression of a proposed Israeli aggression, it would more accurately represent a permissible example of anticipatory self-defense. In the final analysis, such an Israeli preemption could prevent a later nuclear war with Iran, an outcome that would be infinitely more injurious for all concerned.
Iran, it ought not to be overlooked, is an enemy state that not only supports anti-Israel terrorism, but also makes expressly genocidal threats against the “Zionist Entity.”[24] Together with aggression, which is being committed against Israel whenever there are state-supported terrorist attacks, genocide represents an egregious crime under international law. Under “normal” circumstances, Samson might not provide any identifiable security benefits to Israel, but that calculus would change dramatically if Iran were allowed to become nuclear.
[1] The Samson metaphor used here is drawn of course from the Biblical Book of Judges.
[2] See by this author at BESA (Israel): Louis René Beres, https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/516-Israeli-Security-and-Enemy-Rationality-Beres-Author-approved-version.pdf
[3] See, by this author, at Modern Diplomacy: Louis René Beres: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/07/17/a-new-films-hidden-message-oppenheimer-escalation-dominance-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/
[4]Nonetheless, visible Israeli preparations for such warfighting could be a part of rationality-based deterrence theory. Here, Israeli preparations for nuclear war fighting would not be considered as distinct alternatives to nuclear deterrence, but rather as essential or even integral components of nuclear deterrence. Some years ago, strategist Colin Gray, reasoning about U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations, argued that a vital connection exists between “likely net prowess in war and the quality of pre-war deterrent effect.” (See: Colin Gray, National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 6, No. 2, fall 1981, p. 35.) Elsewhere, in a published debate with this writer, Gray said essentially the same thing: “Fortunately, there is every reason to believe that probable high proficiency in war-waging yields optimum deterrent effect.” (See Gray, “Presidential Directive 59: Flawed but Useful,” PARAMETERS, 11, No. 1, March 1981, p. 34. Gray was responding directly to Louis René Beres, “Presidential Directive 59: A Critical Assessment,” PARAMETERS, March 1981, pp. 19 – 28.)
[5] Under international law, the idea of a Higher Law – drawn originally from the ancient Greeks and ancient Hebrews – is contained, inter alia, within the principle of jus cogens or peremptory norms. In the language of pertinent Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969: “A peremptory norm of general international law….is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
[6] A significant part of this management challenge concerns Israel’s intelligence community. See, on this point, Louis René Beres, “Israel’s Strategic Doctrine: Updating Intelligence Community Responsibilities,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 28, No.1., Spring 2015, 89-104.
[7]The most plausible paths to nuclear war fighting in the Middle East are: (1) enemy nuclear first-strikes against Israel (not a present possibility, unless one were to include Pakistan as an “enemy”[7]); (2) enemy non-nuclear WMD first-strikes against Israel that elicit Israeli nuclear reprisals, either promptly, or as a consequence of escalation processes; (3) Israeli nuclear preemptions against hard targets in enemy states with nuclear assets (not a present possibility, unless, again, we were to include Pakistan as an enemy state); (4) Israeli non-nuclear preemptions against hard targets in enemy states with nuclear assets, that elicit enemy nuclear reprisals, either promptly, or via incremental escalation processes (not a present possibility, excluding Pakistan); and (5) Israeli non-nuclear preemptions against hard targets in enemy states without nuclear assets, that elicit substantial enemy biological warfare reprisals and, reciprocally, Israeli nuclear counter-retaliations. Other credible paths to nuclear war fighting in the region could include accidental/unintentional/inadvertent/unauthorized nuclear attacks between Israel and enemy states. Here we should also consider the potentially threatening prospect of escalation from instances of WMD terrorism against Israel.
[8] For assessments of the probable consequences of nuclear war fighting by this author, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington MA; Lexington Books, 1984); Louis René Beres, ed., Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1986); and Louis René Beres, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016/2018).
[9]The idea of an apocalypse seems to have been born in ancient Iran (Persia), with the Manichaeism of the Zoroastrians. At least one of these documents, The War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness, found in a Qumran cave, is a comprehensive description of Jewish military tactics and regulations at the end of the Second Commonwealth. The Sons of Light were expected to prevail in battle against the Sons of Darkness before the “end of days,” and the later fight at Masada was widely interpreted as a genuinely apocalyptic struggle between a saintly few, and the many wicked.
[10] Such a “dielectric” will be analytically indispensable to pertinent Israeli strategic planning. Nonetheless, because it may prove unfamiliar to ordinary kinds of strategic thinking (e.g., focusing more or less statically on an enemy’s presumed “order of battle”), this sort of new methodology could face stiff resistance from both military and intelligence communities. “Whenever the new Muses present themselves,” warned the prophetic Spanish existentialist philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, “the masses bristle.” See Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (1925) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, 1968),p.7.
[11]Jurisprudentially, there is an important distinction between preemptive attacks and preventive attacks. Preemption is a military strategy of striking an enemy first, in the expectation that the only alternative is to be struck first oneself. A preemptive attack is launched by a state that believes enemy forces are about to attack. A preventive attack is launched not out of concern for imminent hostilities, but for fear of a longer-term deterioration in the vital military balance.
[12] The precise origins of anticipatory self-defense in customary international law lie in the Caroline, a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the Caroline case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property, reprinted in 2 Classics of International Law, 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) 1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations, reprinted in 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, The Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682).
[13] This writer was Chair of Project Daniel. http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/03-ISSUE/daniel-3.htm See also, by Professor Louis René Beres: http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2905LouisReneBeres.pdf; and http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/07spring/beres.pdf
[14] Worth mentioning, however, is that even an unconventional or expressly nuclear preemptive strike could be lawful. In this connection, see Summary of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion 1996.
[15] These calculated emphases bring to mind Sun-Tzu’s well-known suggestion to embrace the “unorthodox.” For a specific application to Israel of Sun-Tzu’s ancient wisdom, by this author, see: Louis René Beres, “Lessons for Israel from Ancient Chinese Military Thought: Facing Iranian Nuclearization with Sun-Tzu,” Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, October 24, 2013.
[16] Regarding “spill overs” from other parts of the world to the Middle East, North Korea helped Syria to build a nuclear reactor, the same facility that was ultimately destroyed by Israel in its Operation Orchard, on September 6, 2007. Although, unlike the 1981 Operation Opera, this preemptive attack, in the Deir ez-Zor region, was also presumptively a second expression of the “Begin Doctrine.” It also illustrated, because of the North Korea connection, a much wider global threat to Israel.
[17] On Israel and ballistic missile defenses, see earlier writings co-authored with IDF Major General (res.) Isaac Ben-Israel, also a former Head of the Israel Space Agency: Louis René Beres and Major-General (IDF/ret.) Isaac Ben-Israel, “Think Anticipatory Self-Defense,” The Jerusalem Post, October 22, 2007; Professor Beres and Major-General Ben-Israel, “The Limits of Deterrence,” Washington Times, November 21, 2007; Professor Beres and MG Ben-Israel, “Deterring Iran,” Washington Tines, June 10, 2007; and Professor Beres and MG Ben-Israel, “Deterring Iranian Nuclear Attack,” Washington Times, January 27, 2009.
[18]The principle of “military necessity” is defined authoritatively as follows: “Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be applied.” See: United States, Department of the Navy, jointly with Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, Norfolk, Virginia, October 1995, p. 5-1.
[19] This should also bring to mind the closing query of Agamemnon in The Oresteia by Aeschylus: “Where will it end? When will it all be lulled back into sleep, and cease, the bloody hatreds, the destruction”?
[20] For earlier assessments of threats from Iran, see Louis René Beres and John T. Chain (General/USAF/ret.), “Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran”? The Atlantic, August, 2012; and Professor Louis René Beres and General Chain, “Israel and Iran at the Eleventh Hour,” Oxford University Press (OUP Blog), February 23, 2012. General Chain was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).
[21] See, by this author, Louis René Beres, at Air-Space Operations Review; USAF: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-1_Issue-1/Beres_Nuclear_War_Avoidance.pdf
[22] From an expressly international law perspective, our still-anarchic international system originated with the Peace of Westphalia. See Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct 1648, 1, Consol. T.S. 119.
[23]Nonetheless, in law, there is a proper place for retribution. At the Nuremberg Trials, the precise words used by the Court, “So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished,” represented an authoritative reaffirmation of the peremptory principle of law known as Nullum crimen sine poena, “No crime without a punishment.” The earliest statement of Nullum crimen sine poena can be found in the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1728-1686 BCE); the Law of Eshnunna (ca. 2000 BCE); the even-earlier Code of Ur-Nammu (ca. 2100 BCE); and – most significantly for Israel – the so-called Lex Talionis, or law of exact retaliation, which is presented in three separate passages of the Torah. For the ancient Hebrews, moreover, when a crime involved the shedding of blood, not only punishment, but also a punishment that involved a reciprocal bloodletting – was demanded. For the early Hebrew nation, shedding of blood was an abomination that must be expiated in kind: “For blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made for the land, for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed it” (Numbers: 35:33).
[24] See, by this author, Professor Louis René Beres: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351157568-12/justice-realpolitik-international-law-prevention-genocide-louis-ren%C3%A9-beres To be sure, the operational specifics of any such defensive strike would also need to be consistent with the law of war.